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(un)equivocal numbers, (counter)intuitive knowledge, (in)credible data, and (in)scrutable models. We show 
how organizational actors establish and re-negotiate trust under messy and uncertain analytic conditions 
through practices of skepticism, assessment, and credibility. Highlighting the collaborative and heterogeneous 
nature of real-world data science, we show how the management of trust in applied corporate data science 
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beyond CSCW.  
CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing → Collaborative and Social Computing → Empirical 
Studies in Collaborative and Social Computing 
KEYWORDS 
Trust; Credibility; Data Science; Collaboration; Organizational Work 
ACM Reference Format: 
Samir Passi and Steven J. Jackson. 2018. Trust in Data Science: Collaboration, Translation, and Accountability in Corporate 
Data Science Projects. In Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, Vol. 2, CSCW, Article 136 (November 
2018). ACM, New York, NY. 28 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3274405 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Data science tools and techniques constitute an increasingly common and complex feature of 
contemporary work settings, impacting modes of knowledge and governance [27,66,67], shaping 
organizational practices [15,52,99], reconfiguring publics [20,50,56], and simultaneously enabling 
and constraining the possibilities of human action and agency [9,10,74].1 But the limits and 
tensions of data science work in its collaborative dimensions are not yet fully scoped. Researchers 
argue that “everything might be collected and connected, [but] that does not necessarily mean that 
everything can be known” [80]. Data are never “raw” [34], often speaking specific forms of 
knowledge to power [10,74,102]. In the current push towards algorithmic analyses, what counts as 
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valid and reliable knowledge remains contested [52–54,63]. Algorithmic results based on 
“sufficient” data, however, are often considered “credible” enough to serve as actionable evidence 
[43,104]. “[The] idea of data-led objective discoveries entirely discounts the role of interpretive 
frameworks in making sense of data which [are] a necessary and inevitable part of interacting with 
the world, people and phenomena” [69:320]. If data science enables us to ask different questions 
and generate novel insights, it also requires varied and distributed forms of interpretation and 
discretionary judgment that ensure meaningfulness, confidence, and reliability of algorithmic 
results. Put simply: data science is a sociomaterial practice [73] in which human and technical 
forms of work intertwine in specific, significant, and mutually shaping ways. The effective practice 
and governance of data science therefore remain top priorities for data science researchers and 
practitioners alike. 
Central to all of this is trust. The credibility of algorithmic results is adjudged variously—at 
times through statistical probabilities and performance metrics, and at other times through prior 
knowledge and expert judgments. The reliability and valence of algorithmic results, as data 
scientists well know, is also impacted by factors such as the framing of questions, the choice of  
algorithms, and the calibration of models.2 Established credibility mechanisms such as statistical 
significances, quantified metrics, and theoretical bounds comprise forms of calculated trust, but 
their effective use remains challenging. Data scientists may have the necessary expertise to test 
systems, but the manual intractability of large-scale data coupled with the complex, sometimes 
opaque, nature of state-of-the-art models makes it hard even for them to clearly articulate and 
ascribe trustworthiness to approaches and insights. This is even harder for lay users who lack 
specialized data science knowledge but are sometimes the users of these systems or those most 
impacted by them. CSCW and HCI researchers have begun to take on these challenges through 
efforts to make results more understandable [81,82], to effectively manage data science systems 
[55,65], to understand user perception of performance metrics [48], and to ascertain ways to foster 
trust through system design [57,58].  
Contemporary understanding of data science in research is largely based on the analysis of data 
science work in academic and research sites [26,66,71,75,76,83,98]; shaped by limits of access, 
confidentiality, and non-disclosure, the large body of applied data science work in corporate 
settings has received much less attention. Crawford & Calo [19] argue that the lack of research 
focus on already in-use data science systems has created a “blind spot” in our understanding of data 
science work. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in a corporate data science team, this paper 
attempts to bridge this gap by describing how problems of trust and credibility are negotiated and 
managed by actors in applied and corporate settings, with a focus on two separate projects: churn 
prediction and special financing. We describe how four common tensions in corporate data science 
work – (un)equivocal numbers, (counter)intuitive knowledge, (in)credible data, and (in)scrutable 
models – raise problems of trust, and show the practices of skepticism, assessment, and credibility 
by which organizational actors establish and re-negotiate trust under uncertain analytic conditions: 
work that is simultaneously calculative and collaborative. Highlighting the heterogeneous nature of 
real-world data science, we show how management and accountability of trust in applied data 
science work depends not only on pre-processing and quantification, but also on negotiation and 
translation—producing forms of what we identify as ‘algorithmic witnessing’ and ‘deliberative 
 
2 The term ‘algorithm’ refers to the underlying statistical/computational, approach (e.g., ‘random forests’ is an algorithm). The term ‘model’ 
refers to the specific application of an algorithm to a dataset (e.g., using ‘random forests’ on ‘user data’ produces a model). 
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accountability.’ Trust in data science is therefore best understood as a deeply collaborative 
accomplishment, undertaken in the service of pragmatic ways of acting in an uncertain world.  
In the following sections, we begin by reviewing history and sociology of science, social 
science, critical data science, and CSCW literature on trust and credibility in science and 
technology more broadly and data science and organizations more specifically. We then describe 
our research site and methodology, before moving to two empirical examples illustrating the 
challenges and complexity of trust in applied data science work. We conclude by describing our 
findings concerning the negotiation of trust in real-world data science work, highlighting the 
implications of our findings for the data science field, both within and beyond CSCW. 
2 TRUST, OBJECTIVITY, AND JUSTIFICATION 
Our conceptualization of trust begins with an important vein of work in history and sociology of 
science on the relation between science, trust, and credibility. Influential work by Shapin [88] and 
Shapin & Schaffer [91] show how “working solutions” to problems of credibility in early 
experimental science were found in the social perception of gentlemen as “reliable truth-tellers.” A 
gentleman was a person of noble birth, raised in the traditions of civility and therefore marked by a 
commitment to honor, virtue, and righteousness. The seventeenth-century cultural association of 
“gentility, integrity, and credibility” provided forms of social scaffolding to negotiations of 
scientific trust—gentlemen rejected “notions of truth, certainty, rigor, and precision which were 
judged suitable for scholarly inquiry, but out of place in civil conversations” [88:xxx]. The 
perception of gentlemen as oracles of truth, however, rendered other knowers such as laboratory 
technicians invisible [87]. Early experimental science was embedded in (and built on) a “moral 
economy of truth” led by gentlemanly scientists pursuing science with “epistemological decorum.” 
At the same time, techniques of “virtual witnessing” – organized around mechanized experiments, 
standardized (in principle) reproducible methods, and conventionalized forms of reporting – helped 
discipline the senses and lent certainty to experimental knowledge. This combination of social 
order and mechanical apparatus working together – and not uncredited and single testimonies – 
instilled trust and ultimately power in experimental results. Early experimental science was thus a 
collective practice simultaneously social and technical: facts emerged through specific forms of 
sociability embedded within the experimental discourse. 
It was only towards the mid-nineteenth century that “objectivity,” as we understand it today, 
gained prominence as a central scientific ideal [22,23]. Daston & Galison [23], for instance, 
describe a shift from “truth-to-nature,” a mode of objectivity characterized by “reasoned images” of 
natural reality produced by scientists based on theoretical selection and aesthetic judgments of 
exemplary specimens to “mechanical objectivity,” organized around the credibility of mechanized 
means such as photography to produce images untouched by (troubling) individual scientific 
judgments. As the work of interpretation shifted from the maker to the reader, scientific artifacts 
became open to interpretation, making consensus challenging. Agreements between multiple ways 
of seeing required differentiating between right and wrong interpretations: science required the 
correct “professional vision” [36]. As mathematicians and physicists argued for “structural 
objectivity” characterized by forms of measurement and replicability, the role of “trained 
judgments” became salient. Scientists thus chased truth with “calibrated eyes” and standardized 
tools, simultaneously questioning the credibility of their findings, instruments, and knowledge. 
Today, objectivity goes hand in hand with quantification: mechanically-produced numbers 
standing in for factual representations of reality [24,28,47,72,77]. Numbers do not just lend 
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credibility but are themselves “couched in a rhetoric of factuality, imbued with an ethos of 
neutrality, and presented with an aura of certainty” [83:4]. Numbers ascribe but also command 
trust. Trust in numbers, however, as Porter [77] argues, is but one form of “technologies of trust.” 
Through studies of accounting and engineering practices, Porter shows how the “authority of 
numbers” was enacted as a pragmatic response to institutional problems of trust. The twentieth-
century thrust for precision coupled with the rise of mechanical objectivity brought in a “regime of 
calculation” in which rule-bound numbers fostered a “cult of impersonality.” Sanitizing the 
inherently discretionary nature of professional practices, quantification became a rigorous judgment 
criterion: “a way of making decisions without seeming to decide” [77:8]. Numbers, however, don’t 
contain within themselves their own logic of interpretation. As a form of intervening in the world, 
quantification necessitates its own ecologies of usability and valuation. Trust in numbers is 
therefore best understood as a variegated “practical accomplishment” [31,32], emanating from 
efforts at standardization and mechanization, along with forms of professional and institutional 
work [40,42,78,89,90]. 
A second line of work central to problems of trust in complex organizational settings is found in 
pragmatist traditions of social and organizational science. Dewey [25] argues that instead of 
existing as a priori criteria, values – as perceived or assigned worth of things – are continuously 
negotiated within decision-making. Processes of valuation are simultaneously evaluative (how to 
value?) and declarative (what is valuable?). Boltanski & Thévenot [8] focus on the “plurality of 
justification logics” comprising valuation practices. They describe six orders of worth – civic, 
market, industrial, domestic, fame, and inspiration – within which “justifiable agreements” are 
achieved in social and professional practices. Each order of worth signifies its own reality test 
based on “the testimony of a worthy person, […] the greatest number, […] the general will, […] 
the established price, […or] the competence of experts” [8:132] 
Applying these insights to organizational decision-making, Stark [94] builds on Boltanski & 
Thévenot’s [8] work to build a theory of “heterarchies”—organizational forms in which 
professionals operate according to diverse and non-commensurate valuation principles. In his 
ethnographic studies of a factory workshop, a new media firm, and an arbitrage trading room, Stark 
analyzes how actors use diverse “evaluative and calculative practices” to accomplish practical 
actions in the face of uncertainty. In heterarchies, decision-making requires negotiations between 
different, often competing, performance metrics. Stark distinguishes his account of heterarchies 
from Boltanski & Thévenot’s orders of worth in two significant ways. First, while Stark argues that 
decisions are embedded within multiple forms of valuation, he does not believe that decisions are 
confined within a pre-defined matrix of worth. Valuation criteria, for Stark, remain contextual, 
emerging differently in different situations. Second, while Boltanski & Thévenot position orders of 
worth as ways of resolving uncertainty, Stark sees the plurality of valuation as providing 
opportunities for action by creating uncertainty. Organizational conflicts are not roadblocks, but 
integral to organizational diversity in which the “productive friction” between multiple ecologies of 
valuation helps accomplish justification and trust—(dis)trusting specific things, actions, and 
worlds. 
Data science is no different. Integral to several contemporary knowledge practices, algorithmic 
knowledge production is here and now. Big data pushes “the tenets of mechanical objectivity into 
ever more areas of applications”—data science is not just interested in calculating what is, but also 
“aspires to calculate what is yet to come” [83:4]. Given enough data, numbers appear to speak for 
themselves, supplying necessary explanations for all observations [3,43,62,83]. The problem is 
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exacerbated given that automation – as operationalized in and through data science – is often 
understood as an absence of bias [12,27,33,70]. The mathematical foundation of algorithms, 
coupled with the manual intractability of large-scale data, has shaped the use of quantified metrics 
as key indicators to ascertain a data science system’s workability. 
The increased management of data science systems is a priority [65,96,105], but “the complex 
decision-making structure” needed to manage them often exceeds “the human and organizational 
resources available for oversight” [68]. One limiting factor is the opacity of data science systems 
[97,100] arising from a variety of reasons: (a) algorithms are often trade-secrets, (b) data science 
requires specialized knowledge, and (c) novel analytic methods remain conceptually challenging 
[14]. Neural networks are often critiqued for their black-boxed nature,3 but researchers argue that 
even simpler models are not necessarily more interpretable than their complex counterparts [64]. 
The fact that models do not always furnish explanations has sparked efforts to produce humanly 
understandable explanations of data science workings and results [38,82,92]. Another limiting 
factor is the paywalled or proprietary nature of datasets. Several data correlations established in 
large datasets are neither reproducible nor falsifiable [45,61]. The combination of data 
inaccessibility and analytic fragility makes “virtual witnessing” [91] challenging, if not at times 
impossible. While making data public may seem a good first step (though not in the best interests 
of corporations), transparency remains a difficult and problematic ideal [2]. Data science comprises 
myriad forms of discretionary human work—visible only to those in its close vicinity. Algorithmic 
results comprise specific articulations of “data vision”—the situated rule-based traversal of messy 
data through clinical rule-bound vehicles of analysis [75]. The absence of development histories of 
systems further camouflages aspects arising not only from personal and professional values, but 
also from the emergent sites of algorithmic re-use as opposed to their contexts of development 
[29,43,51]. This combination of oversight challenges often causes “non-expert” data subjects to 
lose trust in the enterprise of data science more broadly [17,27,84]. 
CSCW and critical data science researchers have thus put forward an agenda for “human-
centered data science,” arguing that focusing on computational or statistical approaches alone often 
fails to capture “social nuances, affective relationships, or ethical, value-driven concerns” in data 
science practices [4:2]. Such failures cause rifts between developers’ understanding of what the 
system does and the users’ interpretation of the system in practice, causing user and societal 
confidence in these systems to plummet. This is particularly challenging because the systems are 
not usually designed “with the information needs of those individuals facing significant personal 
consequences of model outputs” [7:10]. While quantification provides calculative relief in the face 
of uncertainty, questions of trust are “ultimately questions of interpretation,” and within meaning-
making processes “limitations of traditional algorithm design and evaluation methods” are clearly 
visible [6:10]. Researchers thus focus not only on fostering trust in computational systems [58], but 
also on understanding users’ perception of quantified metrics [48]. 
These bodies of history and sociology of science, critical data studies, CSCW, and social 
science research highlight the import of trust and credibility justifications in data science work. 
Problems of trust in science are solved variously, characterized by a set of key approaches: social 
scaffolding, virtual witnessing, mechanical objectivity, trained judgments, and quantification. 
Beyond a taxonomy of trust mechanisms, this list also makes visible the sociocultural and political 
factors encompassing scientific negotiations on trust. As we grapple with problems of societal trust 
 
3 A neural network contains multiple layers with each layer containing several nodes. Broadly, each node acts as a simple classifier, activating 
upon encountering specific data attributes. Output from one layer forms the input for the next layer. 
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in science and technology, it is important to understand how trust and credibility are established in 
scientific and technological practices at large. Data science charts new knowledge frontiers, but its 
maps remain opaque and distant to all but a few. In complex organization settings, data science is 
transected by multiple experts, interests, and goals, relying upon and feeding into a plethora of 
practices such as business analytics, product design, and project management. Applied data science 
needs not only scientists and engineers, but also managers and executives [55,65]. 
In this paper, we unpack the situated work of organizational actors to engender trust in data, 
algorithms, models, and results in corporate data science practices. Highlighting the plurality of 
valuation practices in organizational decision-making, we describe common tensions in data 
science work and mechanisms by which actors resolve problems of trust and credibility. As forms 
of justification, these mechanisms exemplify pragmatic, not absolute, forms of trust, helping actors 
act and move forward in an uncertain world—valuing specific forms of knowing over others. Our 
goal in this paper is not to merely argue the partial, social, and messy nature of data, models, and 
numbers (a fact readily acknowledged by our actors), but to show how actors negotiate and justify 
the worth of data science solutions to identify opportunities for practical action when faced with 
such conditions. Evaluation of a data science system, as we show in this paper, is rarely the simple 
application of a specific set of criteria to a technology, and often requires specific mechanisms to 
negotiate and translate between multiple situated, often divergent, performance criteria. In this 
paper, we address two of these mechanisms: algorithmic witnessing, in which data scientists assess 
model performance by variously, mostly technically, reproducing models and results; and, 
deliberative accountability, in which multiple experts assess systems through collaborative 
negotiations between diverse forms of trained judgments and performance criteria. 
3 RESEARCH SITE, METHODS, AND FINDINGS 
The paper that follows builds on six months of ethnographic fieldwork with DeepNetwork4, a 
multi-billion-dollar US-based e-commerce and new media organization. To gain more immersive 
and participatory access to ongoing and ordinary work practices and experiences, the first author 
worked as a data scientist at the organization between June and November 2017, serving as lead 
data scientist on two business projects (not reported in this paper) and participating in several 
others. Founded in the nineties, DeepNetwork owns 100+ companies in domains such as health, 
legal, and automotive. A number of these are multi-million-dollar companies with several thousand 
clients each. The organization has a core data science team based on the US West Coast that works 
with multiple businesses across different domains and states. There are multiple teams of data 
engineers, software developers, and business analysts both at DeepNetwork and its subsidiaries. 
While not a research-driven data science organization (in the fashion, for example, of Google, 
Amazon, or Facebook), DeepNetwork remains an extremely data-driven company with copious 
amounts of data across numerous businesses. Its focus however is not data science research 
(though it holds data science patents), but business applications of data science. During our time at 
the company, the data science team comprised eight to eleven members (including the first author). 
The team’s supervisor is Martin—DeepNetwork’s Director of Data Science with 30+ years of 
industry experience managing business projects in several major technology firms. Martin and the 
data science team report directly to Justin—DeepNetwork’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO). 
 
4 All organization and personnel names have been replaced with pseudonyms. 
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Justin is one of the company’s seven executives and has 20+ years of experience in the technology 
industry.  
The first author applied for the data scientist position at DeepNetwork, going through a series of 
technical and behavioral interviews. All interviewees were explicitly informed that our primary 
goal was to research corporate data science practices. We clearly stated that we would work at the 
organization for a fixed time duration (three to six months) and would need explicit permission to 
conduct research in company premises, gathering data such as field notes and audio-recorded 
interviews. DeepNetwork’s decision to hire the first author as an interning data scientist was based 
primarily on the assessment of the first author’s data science knowledge and expertise. As part of 
the negotiation process, we settled on three key aspects of our research design. First, participation 
was optional, and each participant needed to sign a consent form (we provided a copy of our 
consent form for approval). Participants could opt-out of research at any point, and all company, 
personnel, and project names would be replaced with pseudonyms to preserve anonymity and 
privacy. Second, participants could consent to selective participation. E.g., a participant could 
consent to the fieldwork (i.e., have their data recorded in field notes) but not to the interview. 
Participants could further choose not to have their interviews audio-recorded (we provided copies 
of our interview topic guides for approval but explained that the guides would change over the 
course of research). Third, the organization could define what research data could and could not be 
collected, but the analysis of ethnographic and interview data, including for reasons of inter-
participant privacy, would be done solely by the researchers. We also provided a copy of the 
approval certificate for our research project from our university’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). All our submitted documents were vetted by DeepNetwork’s Human Resources and Legal 
departments. DeepNetwork agreed to research participation. As part of the non-disclosure 
agreement, we agreed not to make any copies of company datasets and proprietary code. In 
practice, both participants and company leaders participated willingly and openly in research, and 
only two people declined our request to record their interviews. 
During the six-month period, we conducted 50+ interviews with data scientists, project 
managers, product managers, business analysts, and company executives and produced 400+ pages 
of fieldwork notes and 100+ photographs. Interviews and fieldnotes were transcribed and coded 
according to the principles of grounded theory analysis, as articulated by Anselm Strauss and 
students [16,95] and as previously applied in CSCW research by scholars such as Ellen Balka 
[5,85] and Susan Leigh Star [93]. During fieldwork, we began to encounter discrepancies between 
how different organizational actors (such as data scientists, project managers, and business 
analysts) articulated problems with and confidence in data and models. We saw how data science 
projects consisted of diverse negotiations to tackle varying forms of uncertainties. We followed up 
on this theme during fieldwork by focusing our attention on the points of friction and collaboration 
between different organizational actors and groups (in field notes and interviews). Post-fieldwork, 
we organized our interview and fieldwork data in two ways: (a) categorized by projects (e.g., all 
data on the project churn prediction in one place), and (b) categorized by actor groups (e.g., all data 
on business analysts in one place). The former enabled us to analyze themes within and across 
different projects, and the latter allowed us to examine the perspectives of specific professional 
groups. 
The theme of trust began to emerge, as part of our own thematic coding, when analyzing the 
data about forms of friction and collaboration between different organizational actors. We 
identified a series of situated tensions in corporate data science work (the four most salient of 
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which we report below) through two rounds of coding (with open and in-vivo codes5 such as 
explanation, translation, expertise, intuition, mess, and verification). Per grounded theory principle 
of ‘constant comparison’ [35], we frequently juxtaposed and analyzed individual tensions across 
different corporate project and professional group descriptions looking for both distinctions and 
common patterns. We started to see in the situated resolutions of these tensions a common recourse 
to making (in)visible specific aspects of data science work. For example, the incompleteness of 
datasets was often foregrounded as a key reason for sub-optimal model performance in project 
meetings. Our subsequent analysis of the strategies that actors used to resolve these tensions 
comprised a second round of coding with open and in-vivo codes such as testing, data processing, 
value, and narrativization. We chose trust as the organizing theme for this paper, but in our analysis 
the theme of trust remained (and remains) intermingled with several other themes not explicitly 
addressed in this paper, including standardization, invisible work, materiality, and repair. While the 
specific project cases reported in this paper were selected for their salience to the tensions and 
practices highlighted here, they are broadly representative of patterns identified across the much 
larger number of cases not reported on and are moreover consistent with the first author’s 
experience as project lead or collaborator on separate projects not reported in this paper. Specific 
quotations in the empirical stories that follow reflect a mix of transcript data from project meetings 
(and thus embedded in the ordinary flow of everyday corporate work), and separate interviews 
conducted with the first author. Audio-recorded personal communications are referenced as 
‘interviews’ and non-audio-recorded conversations from team meetings and everyday work are 
referenced as ‘fieldwork notes.’ We have provided short biographical notes on each actor to 
provide further empirical context (certain details have been omitted for participant anonymity). 
The first author’s dual role as both ethnographer and data scientist, communicated explicitly in 
the first meeting with each participant, presented both research opportunities and challenges. On 
the one hand, working as a data scientist helped build rapport with corporate personnel. For 
instance, after about four weeks, everyday meetings between the first author and data science team 
members were dominated by detailed and practical conversations around technical challenges, 
algorithmic issues, and ongoing projects. Even non-data-scientists began to see the first author 
primarily as a data scientist—in audio-recorded interviews that were mainly organized for research 
purposes, for instance, product managers and business analysts would continue to ask questions 
about and discuss project updates and requirements. The fact that after about two months the first 
author became the lead data scientist on two projects further helped solidify their primary identity 
as that of a data scientist—to the extent, for instance, that the data scientists often explicitly 
articulated surprise (e.g.: ‘but, you knew that, right?’) when the first author would ask them to 
explain aspects of their everyday work for the ethnographic record. On the other hand, the first 
author’s data scientist identity posed difficulties in personal communication with non-data-
scientists. Business team members, for instance, were hesitant to point out mistakes and problems 
with the data science team, sometimes resorting to conciliatory descriptions such as ‘your team did 
its best,’ ‘maybe the problem is on our side,’ and ‘we do love the work your team is doing.’ In 
these moments, the first author had to work to make visible their dual role, reminding the 
interviewees that this was after all a research interview and assuring them that their critique would 
never be directly communicated to CTO Justin, director of data science Martin, or other data 
scientists. 
 
5 In-vivo coding involves generating codes from the empirical data (e.g.: using an actor phrase as a code) while open coding involves codes 
manually assigned by the researcher based on ongoing analysis of the empirical data. 
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3.1 CASE 1 | CHURN PREDICTION 
For case one, we focus on a churn prediction project – i.e. the detection of currently active 
customers who are likely to cancel paid services in the future – associated with DeltaTribe, a multi-
million-dollar marketing and management subsidiary owned by DeepNetwork, that provides online 
customer management services to thousands of clients across the United States in domains such as 
medical, dental, veterinary, and automotive. In business terminology, customers who cancel paid 
services are called ‘churned,’ and active customers who might cancel paid services are called 
‘likely to churn.’ In what follows, we describe key moments from the project to show how tensions 
emerge as actors negotiate the trustworthiness of numbers and intuition. 
(Un)equivocal Numbers 
When we began fieldwork, the project’s data scientists – David6 and Max7 – had already settled on 
two models after trying several approaches.8 Their models differed not only in their algorithmic 
approaches, but also in their data. David’s model used subscription data consisting of information 
such as the services enabled for a customer and their platform settings. Collected monthly, this data 
was available for the past two years—a total of 24 datasets. Max’s model used action data 
containing data on customers’ actions such as the modules they accessed and when. This data was 
collected every day but was not archived—each day’s collection overwrote the previous day’s data. 
David’s subscription-based model therefore had more historical data to work with than Max’s 
action-based model. David’s model, however, had lower accuracy than Max’s model.9 Both 
believed that “more data was better,” but the jury was out on whether more data led to better 
performance. In fact, Max’s model had an accuracy of ~30%—a number higher only in comparison 
to the ~20% accuracy of David’s model. Director of data science Martin10 was “disappointed” in 
both models. 
Over time, accuracy scores did not increase, but the data science team’s disappointment in their 
models decreased. This was because accuracy score – as a performance metric – was devalued by 
team members over the course of the project. For instance, data science team’s project manager 
Daniel11 found accuracy scores problematic given his prior experiences of working with business 
teams: 
Daniel (project manager): When we say to business teams that we have 90% accuracy, they think: 
‘oh, you are saying with a 90% confidence that these people are going to churn.’ NO, THAT’S NOT 
WHAT WE ARE SAYING! They think in black and white: likely to churn or not likely to churn. In 
total we have four answers: (a) people we say will churn, and who churn [true positives], (b) people 
we say will churn, but don’t [false positives], (c) people we say won’t churn, and don’t [true 
negatives], and (d) people we say won’t churn, but churn [false negatives]. Business folks don’t 
know what the numbers really mean (Fieldwork Notes, June 8, 2017). 
 
6 David has an undergraduate degree in electrical and electronics engineering and several online data science certifications. He has been with 
DeepNetwork for a little less than two years. Before this, he worked as a Product Engineer. 
7 Max has an undergraduate degree in information and computer science and a graduate degree in mathematics and statistics. He has been 
with DeepNetwork for a little less than two years. Before this, he worked as a Statistical Consultant.  
8 Model one was based on gradient boosting algorithm (xgboost), and model two on random forests. 
9 In churn prediction, the accuracy score refers to the percentage of correctly identified likely-to-churn customers (who do cancel their 
services in the future) in the total number of likely-to-churn customers identified by a model.  
10 Martin has an undergraduate degree in electronics and electrical engineering, and graduate degrees in computer science and business 
administration. He has been with DeepNetwork for 5+ years. Before this, he had 25+ years of experience in the technology industry in several 
roles such as vice-president engineering, director engineering, and research engineer.   
11 Daniel has an undergraduate and a graduate degree in computer science. He worked at DeepNetwork for 2.5 years (he left in late 2017 to 
join as a process manager in an academic institute). Before this, he worked as a Technology Consultant. Outside the technological domain, he 
has eight years of work experience in industrial warehousing and public relations.     
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This point was borne out in a subsequent interview with Parth12, DeltaTribe’s business analyst, who 
described his perception of low accuracy scores: 
Parth (business analyst): “Expectation-wise […], this project was going to be the silver bullet. 
Then, expectations were, I guess, neutralized or you know, brought down to earth. […] I thought [it] 
was going to be 80% or 90% accuracy. […] In reality, it was more like 20-30%. That’s where the 
expectations for me were shattered, I guess” (Interview, October 26, 2017). 
For Parth, a low accuracy score signaled failure. His assessment was largely based on performance 
numbers that he believed provided definite information about the model. Both Parth and Charles13 – 
another business analyst – were also skeptical of numbers produced by the models: the likely-to-
churn customer probabilities.  A likely-to-churn probability, generated by the model, indicates the 
model’s perception of a customer’s likelihood to churn (the higher the number, the higher the 
likelihood). Parth and Charles found the probabilities helpful but incomplete on their own without 
further information on how they were generated. 
Charles (business analyst): “We were looking for [likely-to-churn probabilities]. But, keep in mind 
that, that number does not tell the full story. It is a good indicator, but it is not the absolute truth for 
us. […] It [only] helps us identify which customers to go for, [but not why].” 
Parth (business analyst): “The more we understand how models work […] allow[s] us to 
understand: ‘ok, this score actually means this or when there is a change, [it] means that’.” (ibid.) 
These probabilities were not always a part of the results. Initially, the results only contained 
customer IDs and a label indicating whether the model perceived a customer as ‘likely-to-churn’ or 
‘not-likely-to-churn.’ The move to probabilities, as we show below, was largely an outcome of the 
devaluation of accuracy scores. In addition to voicing concerns about the business interpretation of 
accuracy scores, and performance metrics in general, project manager Daniel and data scientists 
David and Max argued that low scores in the project were not a sign of “bad models,” but of the 
“extremely hard” nature of churn prediction itself. 
David (data scientist): It is tough. Customers churn for any reason and you can’t know that. E.g., 
they want to save money, or their boss told them to cancel. Even with all the data, we can’t be 
perfect. Almost impossible (Fieldwork Notes, August 16, 2017). 
Daniel (project manager): “[Accuracy] is so low because you are trying to predict a very difficult 
concept, […] to explain human behavior. […] It is random to a degree. There is stuff that you can 
predict and model, but […] it just seems unreasonable to […] a data scientist that you can create a 
model that perfectly models human behavior. […] The challenge with non-technical people is they 
think that computers can do more than they really can” (Interview, June 30, 2017). 
Most predictions made by the models were incorrect, but the data science team gradually saw value 
in the small handful of correct predictions: 30% was better than nothing. As Daniel put it, “even 
bad results or less than ideal results can be good—it is more than what you know now.” The 
perceived value of having some predictions over none further shaped the data science team’s 
outlook towards model results and metrics. This prompted the move towards likely-to-churn 
probabilities. While binary labels – likely-to-churn/not-likely-to-churn – drew attention to which 
labels were right and which were wrong, churn probabilities instead brought to light customers at 
varying levels of churn risk. The results were now in the form of an ordered list of customers with 
decreasing likely-to-churn probabilities.  
 
12 Parth has been with DeltaTribe for 8+ years. Before this, he was an Assistant Manager in a corporation (4+ years).  
13 Charles has been with DeltaTribe for 5+ years. Before this, he was a Consultant in a corporation (5+ years). 
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Martin (director of data science): Think of it as a list that if you are on it, you are going to die. We 
provide the ones with the highest probability of dying and tell our business team that maybe you 
should reach out to these folks. By doing this we deemphasize the 30% and say: ‘how can a low 
30% score still be made useful for businesses?’ (Fieldwork Notes, May 30, 2017). 
(Counter)intuitive Knowledge 
The results were presented to DeltaTribe’s business analysts Parth and Charles. A feature 
importance list accompanied the results.14 Director of data science Martin and project manager 
Daniel considered the list an important part of the results—an explanation mechanism to help the 
business team “see” what the models considered noteworthy. Within minutes of seeing the results, 
both Parth and Charles described the results as “useful.” Their perception of the usefulness of 
results, however, was not grounded in model performance metrics (mentioned once in the hour-
long meeting) or in the manual inspection of customer accounts (not done in the meeting at all). 
Instead, their perception was based solely on the feature importance list. 
Daniel (project manager): Here [points to a slide with feature importances] we see that whether 
customer enabled email and voice were important. So was use, how much the customer engages. It 
might mean engagement with the platform is good, and customers who engage remain active. Also 
[points to a different part] communication was important. 
Martin (director of data science): Do these results match your gut feeling, your intuition? 
Charles (business analyst): Definitely! These are things we already focus on (Fieldwork Notes, 
June 9, 2017). 
Certain highly-weighted features matched business intuitions, and everyone in the meeting 
considered this a good thing. Models that knew “nothing about the business” had correctly 
identified certain aspects integral to business practices. Such forms of intuitive results were 
important not only for business analysts, but also for data scientists. In an interview, director of 
data science Martin described how “seeing” intuitive patterns had helped him corroborate results: 
Martin (director of data science): “We saw patterns [showing that] there is this cohort of 
customers that are less than one year old, and they are clustered in their behavior. […] This other 
cluster of customers that have been with us more than X number of years and […] their behavior 
looks like this. […] The graph was SO important. […] To me, it is easier to look at a graph, 
especially one […] so obvious in terms of patterns” (Interview, August 23, 2017). 
In the meeting with business analysts, however, not all feature importances mirrored business 
expectations. Parth asked Daniel why a specific feature that DeltaTribe considered important did 
not show up in the top ten features identified by the models. Daniel argued that even if expected 
features were absent, it did not mean that the models were necessarily wrong: 
Daniel (project manager): If you see a feature in the middle of the pack but expect it to be higher, 
it might mean that in your business you already focus on it. Its importance perhaps went down over 
time. If you focus on these [points to top features] that are prioritized by models, we expect that 
these will also go down over time. You focus on customers that we say are at risk. They don’t 
cancel. This is good. But, it means that features will change (Fieldwork Notes, June 9, 2017). 
Regarding counter-intuitive feature importances, Daniel reminded Parth and Charles that machine-
learning models do not approach data in the same way humans do. He pointed out that models use “a 
lot of complex math” to tell us things that we may not know or fully understand. While DeltaTribe 
 
14 In machine learning, features refer to measurable attributes. E.g., ‘whether email is enabled’ is one feature of a customer. Algorithms 
analyze features to calculate results. A feature importance list, produced by certain algorithms, contains features and their weights. The 
weights signal the relative importance of each feature in the algorithmic model’s analysis. 
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may consider a feature important for their business, models may spot the over-time devaluation of the 
feature’s importance for a specific business practice (here, churn). The feature importance list 
signaled the flux of business practices and priorities. If an “intuitive” feature had been sufficiently 
incorporated in business practices, Daniel and Martin argued, it would – from the model’s perspective 
– cease to be “important.” Counter-intuitive findings were also valuable. This tension between 
intuitive results and counter-intuitive discovery showed up again in our interview with Jasper15—
DeltaTribe’s CTO. As he explained, one way to assess the efficacy of a counter-intuitive result was to 
juxtapose it with the intuitiveness of the data science workflow. 
“When I get an end-result type of an answer, I like to understand […] the factors that went into it, and 
how they [data scientists] weighed it to make sure that it makes intuitive sense. […] I understand that a 
lot of the times, findings will be counter-intuitive. I am not immediately pre-disposed to distrust 
anything that doesn’t make intuitive sense. I just like to understand the [significant] factors. […] 
Understanding the exact algorithm, probably less so. […] Understanding process is really important 
[…] to trust that (pause) science was allowed to take its proper course” (Interview, November 14, 
2017). 
The tension between intuition and counter-intuition was not limited to algorithmic results. The 
business goals themselves, Jasper further argued, may often appear counter-intuitive. This was the 
case, for instance, with Jasper’s requirement of sensitivity over precision. A model configured for 
sensitivity prioritizes recall, aiming to maximize the number of correct predictions in its results.16 A 
model configured for precision, however, prioritizes positive predictive value, aiming to maximize the 
correctness of its predictions.17 
Jasper (CTO, DeltaTribe): “As a pragmatist, what I am looking [for] are things that are highly 
sensitive, and their sensitivity is more important to me than their accuracy. […] If you can ensure me 
that of [say] the 2700 [customers] we touch every month, all 500 of those potential churns are in that, 
that’s gold for me. […] If you could tell me [to] only worry about touching 1000 customers, and all 500 
are in it, that’d be even better. But […], let’s start with [making] sure that all the people I need to touch 
are in that population, and make maximum value out of that. […] It is about what outcomes I am trying 
to optimize to begin with, and then what outcomes am I trying to solve for and optimize after. […] You 
want your model to be completely sensitive and completely accurate. Of course! […But,] you don’t 
want to optimize too soon. […] I probably want to talk about dialing up accuracy a little bit [later]. 
[Our current approach] is so inherently inefficient that there is an enormous order of magnitude [of] 
optimization possible without being perfect. […] It is maybe a little bit counter-intuitive, but the goal I 
am trying to solve for is: can I spend a subset of my total resources on a population that is going to 
return well for me, but what I am not doing is avoiding spending resources on people that I should 
have?” (ibid.) 
Business requirements were thus two-fold. On the one hand, the goal was to minimize churn. This led 
to an initial preference for sensitivity. On the other hand, the aim was to optimize resource allocation. 
This led to a subsequent preference for precision. For Jasper, the goals came one after the other—first 
build a sensitive model, and later tune it for precision. The data science team, however, tackled the 
problem differently. Their models were not configured for sensitivity or precision but for specificity. 
A model configured for specificity does not focus on maximizing the number or accuracy of its 
correct predictions but on minimizing the number of its incorrect predictions. The aim was to ensure 
that healthy customers were not incorrectly identified as likely-to-churn. By minimizing incorrect 
 
15 Jasper has been DeltaTribe’s CTO for 2+ years. Before this, he had 25+ years of work experience in the technology industry in several roles 
such as chief information officer, chief operating officer, and senior systems analyst. 
16 Recall is the ratio between True Positives and Total Positives. True Positives are customers that churn and are correctly identified by the 
model as likely-to-churn. Total Positives are the total number of customers that churn. A sensitive model maximizes recall. 
17 Positive predictive value is the ratio between True Positives and the sum of True Positives and False Positives. False Positives are 
customers that don’t churn but are identified by the model as likely-to-churn. A precision model maximizes the accuracy of its predictions. 
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predictions, the team hoped to ensure that customers classified as likely-to-churn were, in fact, 
problematic, guaranteeing that resources were not wasted on healthy customers. For Jasper, the two 
goals married different corporate values with different computational ideals at different points in time. 
The need to separate the two goals (“you don’t want to optimize too soon”), Jasper argued, may seem 
counter-intuitive to data scientists. Indeed, for the data science team the two goals went hand in 
hand—the ‘specific’ solution found in incorrect answers instead of correct ones. At the end of the 
meeting, business analysts Parth and Charles agreed to conduct pilot tests with the results to see if 
they lowered the churn rate. 
There are two striking features evident in the vignette above. First, quantified metrics such as 
precision, recall, specificity, and accuracy remain integral to model assessment, but they are often 
valued differently by different actors. The data science team considered likely-to-churn probabilities a 
valuable resource, but the business team found them incomplete in the absence of knowledge about 
how they were generated. Conversely, while the data science team devalued the usefulness of the 
accuracy score, the business analysts nevertheless considered the score an important signal in 
assessing model usefulness. The business team wanted to first focus on recall and then on precision, 
but the data science team saw in specificity a way to marry both concerns. Thus, while different 
organizational actors differently articulate and negotiate the efficacy of numbers, their use in complex 
collaborative settings engenders specific forms of practical action (e.g., focusing on varying levels of 
churn risk as opposed to the binary of churn or no-churn) and understanding (e.g., prioritizing 
specificity over precision or recall). 
Second, while intuition acts as a form of a reality check in data science practice, it also runs the 
risk of naturalizing or rendering invisible biases and precluding alternate findings. Intuitive results 
and familiar or expected patterns engender trust in algorithmic results, in turn ascribing forms of 
obviousness to data science approaches. While the role of intuition in making sense of data science 
results and processes is revealing, this project surfaced another aspect of the role of intuition in data 
science practice. Organizational actors negotiate not only what is and isn’t intuitive, but also when 
counter-intuition is and isn’t warranted. They leverage both the intuitiveness and counter-intuitiveness 
of results and processes to negotiate trust and credibility in data science systems. The possibility of 
unexpected patterns and counter-intuitive knowledge – one of the great promises of data science work 
after all – stands in contrast and partial tension with intuitive assessment, requiring ongoing forms of 
work to balance between the two. This is especially apparent in projects in which business goals 
themselves may seem to follow a counter-intuitive trajectory to computational ideals. 
3.2 CASE 2 | SPECIAL FINANCING 
For our next case, we turn to a project on special financing i.e. loan financing for people who have 
either low or bad credit scores (usually 300-600) or limited credit history. AutoServe, a DeepNetwork 
subsidiary, helps people to get special financing loans to buy new and used cars. AutoServe’s 
clientele comprises money lenders and auto dealers who pay AutoServe to receive “leads,” i.e. 
information on people interested in special financing. This information comprises several details 
including demographics, address, mortgage, and current salary and employment status. Knowing 
which leads will get approved for loans by lenders/dealers is not straightforward. AutoServe wanted 
to use data science to predict which leads are likely to get financed before they are sent to 
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lenders/dealers. AutoServe assigned Ray18, AutoServe’s business analyst, to work with the data 
science team on this project. 
(In)credible Data 
Both data scientists and business personnel accepted that some leads were good and some bad. For 
Ray, a lead was good if a lender/dealer approved it for financing. Different lenders and dealers, 
however, had different requirements for loan approval. The data science team thus approached the 
question as a matching problem: how do you match leads to lenders and dealers that are more likely 
to finance them? As data scientist Max began work on the project, something troubled him. He 
described his concern in a data science meeting: 
Max (data scientist):  Surprisingly, more than 50,000 people who applied for a [special financing] 
loan earn more than $5000 a month!  Why do you (throws his hands in the air) need a [special 
financing] loan for a car if you earn that much money? Maybe there is noise in the data. I need to fix 
that first (Fieldwork Notes, May 31, 2017). 
Max found it odd that people with $5000 monthly earnings applied for special financing. Underlying 
Max’s inference was his assumption that people with bad credit scores do not earn such salaries. 
Director of data science Martin and DeepNetwork’s CTO Justin19, however, believed otherwise. 
Arguing that the relationship between credit score and salary was tenuous at best, they told Max that 
his interpretation was incorrect. 
Martin (director of data science): That isn’t true. Your current salary cannot tell you whether 
someone would or wouldn’t need a [special financing] loan. Don’t fix anything, please! 
Justin (CTO, DeepNetwork): Yeah, you might have accrued debt or filed for bankruptcy (ibid.). 
While Max’s concern was dismissed as a false alarm, it did not mean that data was not suspect in 
other ways. Throughout the project, there were several discussions around credibility ranging from 
questions of data accuracy to the reliability of the underlying data sources themselves. Business 
analyst Ray, for example, raised concerns about how data used in the project was generated and 
collected: 
Ray (business analyst): “How this business works […] is very strange. […] The fact that [some] 
dataset [come] from affiliate[s]. 20 We [also] generate our leads organically [online…], then there are 
leads that we get from syndication that we bid on. [...] Different pieces of information [are] appended to 
those leads depending on where […they come] from. […] There is one affiliate […], they give a credit 
score range for a bunch of those leads. So, not exactly the score, but they could say ‘this person is 
between 450-475 and 525-550,’ different buckets. [...] Never realistic, but we pay money and we have 
this data.” (Interview, November 8, 2017). 
Acquired through multiple means (e.g., web forms, bidding), lead data was sometimes augmented 
with additional data, such as credit score ranges, by AutoServe’s business affiliates. The role of credit 
score data was particularly revealing. Credit score ranges were a part of leads bought from a small 
number of third-party lending agencies. AutoServe’s business analysts wondered whether credit score 
range data could help them in this project. Credit score ranges, for instance, were already used by 
business analysts as one way to distinguish between two leads that appeared identical but exhibited 
different financeability. 
 
18 Ray has an undergraduate degree in economics and a graduate degree in applied statistics. He has been with DeepNetwork for 2+ years. 
Before this, he worked as a Research Assistant (Statistics) in an academic research center. 
19 Justin has been with DeepNetwork for 12+ years (10+ years as CTO and 2+ years as Vice President, Technology). Before this, he had 7+ 
years of work experience in technology industry in roles such as engineering manager and senior engineer. 
20 The affiliates consist of third-party lending agencies and business associates. 
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Ray (business data analyst): “Two individuals that have the same age, same income, same housing 
payment, same everything […] could have wildly different credit scores. [...] You have those two 
individuals and you send them to the same dealer. From our perspective lead A and B are […] maybe 
not exactly same but close. [...] But, the dealer can finance person A, and they cannot finance person B 
[...] So, when they [dealers] are evaluating from month to month whether they would renew their 
product with us, if we had sent them a bunch from bucket B, and none from A, they are likely to churn. 
But, we have no way of knowing who is in bucket A and who is in bucket B. […] Two individuals who 
measure the same on data points, [could] have two different credit scores.” (ibid.) 
The data science team’s attempt to assess the usefulness of credit score range data, however, faced a 
series of practical challenges. First, the data was incomplete—only available for a few leads 
(~100,000 out of ~1,000,000). Second, the data was approximate—not in the form of a single number 
(e.g., 490), but as a range (e.g., 476-525). Third, the data was inconsistent because different affiliates 
marked ranges differently. For example, a credit score of 490 might be put in the 476-525 range by 
one affiliate and in the 451-500 range by another. Credit score data, considered an important factor by 
the business team, was thus at best sparse, rough, and uneven. As data scientist Max attempted to 
make credit score ranges received from different affiliates consistent with each other, business 
analysts found a way to make this work easier. Pre-existing market analysis (and, to some extent, 
word-of-mouth business wisdom) showed that leads with credit scores greater than 500 were very 
likely to get special financing approval. This piece of information simplified the work of achieving 
consistency across different credit score ranges. Max did not need to figure out ways to reconcile 
overlapping ranges such as 376-425 and 401-450 but could simply include them in the below-500 
category. Only two credit score ranges were now important: below-500 and above-500. The solution 
to the matching problem (which leads are likely to get financed by a lender) was now a classification 
task (which leads have a credit score of over 500). 
Max (data scientist): [AutoServe] really care about 500. If the credit score is below 500, the dealer 
will simply kill the deal. They now want me to tell them whether credit score is below or over 500. The 
problem is there are too many records in 476-525—a very tight group. This makes it difficult 
(Fieldwork Notes, June 13, 2017). 
The presence of several leads in the 476-525 credit score range was a problem given that 500 – a 
number now central to the project – fell right in the center of the range. This made it hard to figure out 
which leads in the 476-525 range were above or below 500. The threshold of 500 had helped 
attenuate the effect of inconsistency but not circumvent it. Max tried several ways to deal with this 
problem, but each attempt decreased the accuracy of his model. Later, he achieved a classification 
accuracy of 76%.21 He did this by completely deleting all the leads from the dataset that were in the 
476-525 range. He acknowledged that this was an imperfect solution but argued that it was a good 
way forward. The model was now accurate for all but a quarter of the leads (better than chance, or 
50/50), but at the cost of removing leads near the crucial threshold of 500. 
(In)scrutable Models 
When Max shared results with the business team, he received mixed reactions. The business team 
was unimpressed with the accuracy scores and uncertain about how the model produced results: 
Bart22 (project manager): ‘We were given a PowerPoint with like, a short note saying here are the 
numbers and here is this technique. [...] We weren’t told much other than that. I personally felt that 
 
21 The number of correctly identified above-500 leads in the total number of leads that the model identified as above-500. 
22 Bart has been with AutoServe for 4+ years. Before this, he had 14+ years of work experience in the technology industry in several roles 
such as business development director, technology and design manager, and data analyst. 
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we weren’t evaluating the model, but it was like—do you like these numbers? That wasn’t helpful. 
We didn’t like the numbers. [But,] we got no explanation of how things worked, how insights were 
generated. We all just weren’t on the same page. [...] Max tried to explain to us, but it was explained 
in a manner [...] we maybe didn’t get? [...] It soon got overwhelming with all the formulas and 
models’ (Interview, November 1, 2017). 
Max provided detailed descriptions of the model’s algorithm, but the “manner” in which he 
explained did not resonate with the business team. Max had used a neural network. The exact 
working of a neural network on a specific dataset is particularly black-boxed even for data 
scientists. In an interview, Max mentioned that the large scale of the data coupled with the complex 
nature of neural networks made it difficult for him to explain to the business team how the model 
made decisions. Max, in fact, argued that understanding how the model made decisions was “not 
that important.” 
Max (data scientist): The reason we use machine learning, we let the machine learn. Like a child 
learns a language. When we say ‘hi,’ the child says ‘hi’ back. We see that, but we don’t know why. 
We don’t ask why the child says ‘hi.’ I don’t get it. We can use tools without understanding the 
tools. E.g., stock markets. There are charts, lines, and we make decisions based on them. We don’t 
know how they work! (Fieldwork Notes, July 13, 2017). 
The data science team was not opposed to explaining the principles underlying their models. It was 
the in situ working of his model that Max argued was black-boxed but also unimportant. In a later 
interview, director of data science Martin described what he thought was the best way to proceed in 
such projects—a combination of “implicit trust” and “explicit verification”: 
Martin (director of data science): “[We need] an implicit trust that the models [produce] correct 
outputs. […] We can explain at some layman’s level […] what algorithms the models are based on, 
[…] what that black box was based on, but please don’t ask me – because I cannot tell you anyway – 
how it got to the result that we are offering to you. I can tell you that […the] model happened to be 
based on […this algorithm] with 10-fold validation. […] I’ll even tell you how […the models] are 
created, what their characteristics are, what [are] the pros and cons of the [model’s] algorithm. But, 
for your case, why did that 0.9 come up versus the 0.84 for customer ID ‘x’ versus ‘z’? Couldn’t tell 
you. […] I am hoping for implicit trust with explicit verification [from a pilot test]. Because if it 
turns out during the pilot that the effectiveness wasn’t there, I am also perfectly okay to call it a 
failure. It did not meet the business requirements, and we did not add value, and I am okay with 
that” (Interview, August 23, 2017). 
For Martin, implicit trust corroborated by explicit verification in the form of “real-world” tests 
remedied the lack of explanations. He wanted to conduct a pilot test with model results to see if 
lender perception of lead efficacy improved. The business team felt otherwise. The absence of 
model explanations did not inspire enough business trust even for a pilot test. With this feedback, 
Max returned to work on his model. 
Two key insights emerge from the description of this project. First, notions of trustworthiness 
in data science practices are entangled with the perceived credibility (or lack thereof) of data itself. 
Differentiating between signal and noise in data is challenging. While data scientist Max assumed a 
set of data values as noise, business analyst Ray doubted the data’s reliability given how it was 
prepared. Incomplete data is a deterrent (e.g., credit score data only available for a handful of 
leads), but even data assumed complete is often inconsistent (e.g., different ranges provided by 
different affiliates) or misaligned (e.g., leads in the 475-525 range stood in opposition to treating 
500 as a threshold). Working solutions to data-driven problems require creative mechanisms and 
situated discretion to work with messiness (e.g., finding ways to make credit score ranges 
consistent across affiliates) and around messiness (e.g., deleting problematic leads).  
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Second, stakeholders’ trust in data science systems stems not only from model results and 
performance metrics, but also from some explanation or confidence in a model’s inner working—
an explanation or confidence which may prove challenging to port between members of the data 
science and business teams. In this project, we see the presence of at least two possible ways to 
unwrap black-boxed models. One way is to explain how a model’s algorithm works in principle. 
Although such explanations are possible and provided by data scientists, we saw in this project 
(and others) that such information was sometimes considered unhelpful by business teams who 
preferred a second kind of explanation: why the model makes a specific decision. Such 
explanations are neither straightforward nor always available. Data scientists describe the lack of 
these explanations not as an impediment but as a trade-off between in-depth understanding and 
predictive power. It is thus not surprising that data scientist Max considered such explanations 
unnecessary. The absence of these explanations necessitates additional work on the part of the data 
science team to help foster business trust in black-boxed models (e.g., combining implicit trust and 
explicit verification). 
4 DISCUSSION 
The two cases above surface crucial tensions within real-world data science practices. In case one – 
churn prediction – we see negotiations concerning the (un)equivocality of numbers and the 
(counter)intuitiveness of results. Quantified metrics, integral to assessing the workings of data 
science solutions, exhibit a certain degree of plasticity. The perceived value of metrics shifts as 
numbers move between people and teams marked by different, often divergent, valuation practices. 
Recourse to intuition may engender confidence but at the risk of camouflaging or dismissing novel 
insights. Balancing between expected and unexpected results is therefore central to the validity of 
intuitive assessments. Through case two – special financing – we see how actors assess data 
(in)credibility and rationalize model (in)scrutability. Prior knowledge and established goals shape a 
dataset’s perceived effectiveness, requiring discretion to work with and around challenges of 
inconsistency, unreliability, and incompleteness. Explaining why models make certain decisions 
(i.e., their situated application) is often as important as describing how they work (i.e., their 
abstract working). The (in)scrutability of a model shapes its evaluation in significant ways. These 
tensions problematize the actors’ ability to trust data, algorithms, models, and results. In the face of 
uncertainty, we see actors using specific mechanisms to resolve and circumvent such problems—
solutions to problems of trust that help enable pragmatic action. We describe these mechanisms in 
the following four sub-sections. 
Contextualizing Numbers 
In case one, we see actors qualify the effective value of quantified metrics in specific ways. A first 
strategy involves decomposing a problematic number into its constituent parts. For the data science 
team, a single accuracy score made invisible, especially to business teams, the four scores 
constituting it (true positives, true negatives, false positives, false negatives). An overall accuracy 
score of, say, 75% demonstrates a model’s success for three-quarters of the data but signals the 
model’s failure for the remaining quarter. Decomposing the score pluralizes the notion of a 
mistake, recasting the missing 25% as a combination of four different kinds of mistakes embedded 
within statistical ideals of precision, recall, or specificity. The business team wanted to first build a 
sensitive model and then tune it for precision. The data science team, however, focused on 
specificity, trying to kill two birds with one stone—minimizing incorrectness to improve recall as 
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well as sensitivity. Different approaches enable prioritization of certain mistakes and values over 
others, facilitating the re-negotiation of the model’s perceived success or failure. During fieldwork, 
we saw several instances in which numbers considered sub-optimal were broken down into their 
constituent parts, while numbers assumed adequate or sufficiently high were often communicated 
and interpreted at face value. 
A second strategy involves situating suspect numbers in a broader context. The accuracy score 
provided information about model performance, but the score’s interpretation extended beyond the 
model. The data science team juxtaposed low accuracy scores with the description of churn 
prediction as a “very difficult” problem. Arguing that customers often churn for reasons 
uncapturable in datasets, they found it unreasonable to assume that human behavior could be 
modeled perfectly. Low performing models shaped the data science team’s understanding of the 
project’s complexity. The value of “even bad results or less than ideal results” was found in their 
ability to provide information not already available to the business team. The accuracy score of 30 
was not 70 less than 100 but, in fact, 30 more than zero. Sub-optimal models were still better than 
nothing. Throughout our fieldwork, we saw instances in which numbers, especially large numbers, 
acted as “immutable mobiles” [60]—as stable and effective forms of data science evidencing. But 
in many others, actors leveraged the inherent mutability of numbers in specific and significant 
ways. The plasticity of numbers in such contexts is therefore partial but strategic. 
Balancing Intuition 
Actors balance intuition and counterintuition in specific ways. A first strategy comprises 
leveraging intuition as an informal yet significant means to ratify results and processes. We saw 
this mechanism at play in case one when data science team members inquired whether computed 
feature importances matched existing business insights. The convergence between model results 
and prior knowledge engendered confidence in the models even when their inner workings were 
not available for inspection. The model’s capability to “discover” already-known business facts 
inspired trust in its analytic ability. In addition to endorsing results, intuition aids assessing project 
workflow. In case one, and multiple times during our fieldwork, we saw business actors enquiring 
into data science processes with an explicit intent to ensure that followed protocols “made intuitive 
sense”—to the extent that the intuitiveness of data science workflows was considered a way to 
assess the efficacy of counter-intuitive results. Different from the scrutiny data scientists already 
employ in their everyday work (e.g., preventing model overfitting), such examinations were 
considered a way to uncover erroneous decisions (e.g., data reorganization) or configurations (e.g., 
flawed assumptions). 
Deploying intuition as a form of assessment, however, has its own problems. Intuitive results 
call further attention to the subset of counter-intuitive results. When certain feature importances 
matched business expectations, business analysts questioned the absence of other expected features. 
Upholding the validity of intuitive assessment in such situations required a way to explain counter-
intuitive findings while not entirely relinquishing the ability for intuitive ratification. This was 
achieved through a second strategy: demarcating between algorithmic and human analytical 
approaches to justify perceived differences. Data science team argued that, unlike humans, 
algorithms statistically traverse the uneven contours of data, producing results that may sometimes 
appear unrecognizable or different. Counter-intuitive findings, they argued, can at times comprise 
novel forms of knowledge and not model mistakes. Balancing between intuition, counter-intuition, 
and trust requires work on the part of organizational actors to negotiate the relations between prior 
knowledge and novel discoveries. Often, intuitive results are made visible to inspire trust in 
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models, while sometimes counter-intuitive results are posited as moments of new discoveries. The 
excessive overlap between model results and prior expectations is also problematic at times since 
intuitive results can stem from overfitted or over-configured models. For example, in a different 
project, we saw that a model whose results completely mirrored existing insights was deemed a 
failure by business personnel who argued that the model “lacked business intelligence” because it 
furnished “no new information.” 
Rationalizing and Reorganizing Data 
In case two, we see how actors negotiate and accomplish data credibility in at least two different 
ways. A first mechanism involves rationalizing suspect data features. The data scientist questioned 
the high salary figures for certain customers with low/bad credit scores. (Differentiating between 
high/low salaries is itself a matter of interpretation). Assuming that people with low/bad credit do 
not earn high salaries, he wanted to get rid of this data. Business personnel, however, invoked the 
fragile relationship between fiscal circumstances and monthly earnings, arguing that people with 
seemingly high salaries were not atypical but ordinary occurrences in the world of special 
financing. Such a form of rationalization involved the contextualization of data in prior knowledge 
to articulate felt, yet practically oriented, experiences of data inconsistency, unreliability, and 
illegitimacy. Technical examination and statistical measures are highly visible forms of data 
credibility arbitration within data science. In this case, and many others, however, we saw that the 
lived experience of data is a significant yet largely under-studied form of credibility assessment. 
A second mechanism comprises reorganizing data in different ways to mitigate identified 
problems. Throughout the project, several problems with the special financing dataset were 
identified such as issues of consistency (credit ranges varied across affiliates) and interpolation 
(leads in the 476-525 range needed approximation around the 500 threshold). Nevertheless, such 
issues did not obstruct the project. Identified problems were tackled in specific, often creative, 
ways. The data scientist tried several ways to achieve compatibility between inconsistent credit 
score ranges. The effect of inconsistency was lessened by the fact that business analysts 
characterized the credit score of 500 as a significant cutoff (scores greater than 500 were 
considered highly likely to get special financing approval). There was no need to make all 
divergent ranges compatible. The leads could simply be restructured into two buckets: above-500 
and below-500. Leads in the 476-525 range, the border between the two classes, were now a 
significant problem. Placing these leads in either bucket required work and discretion to interpolate 
scores in some manner. The problem was resolved by expunging all the leads in the 476-525 
range—a solution considered imperfect but practical. 
Managing Interpretability 
In case two, two kinds of explanations were discussed: how a model works (i.e., the abstract 
working of the model’s underlying algorithm) and why a model makes specific decisions (i.e., the 
situated application of the model on a data point). Explaining the in situ working of, for instance, 
neural networks is difficult and often impossible. The decision process of even relatively simpler 
models is hard to grasp for large-scale data. Data scientists focused instead on the abstract working 
of the model’s underlying algorithm. Few business personnel (particularly those with technical 
backgrounds) found such explanations useful. The majority considered them impractical, wanting 
to understand the rationale behind model decisions more specifically or model complexity more 
generally. Business personnel’s ability to trust results, as they repeatedly told us, was severely 
affected when faced with such forms of “opaque intelligence” [97]. 
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At several instances during our fieldwork, and as described in case two, data science team 
members tried to alleviate this problem by accentuating the perceived import of model results, in 
turn deemphasizing the need to understand algorithms and models. Business personnel desired 
predictive prowess and analytic clarity. Data scientists argued for a trade-off between 
understandability and effectiveness—state-of-the-art models were not entirely inspectable. As one 
data scientist said, the complexity of models is not a problem but the very reason why they work—
a resource for model performance instead of a topic for analytic concern. Transparency remained a 
problematic ideal caught between multiple interpretations of inscrutability [64]. Opacity was often 
perceived as a function of models’ black-boxed nature, necessitating detailed descriptions of 
algorithmic workings. Even when translucent, models remained recondite—their workings were 
complex; their results were hard to explain. Underscoring the import and value of results in these 
circumstances, deemphasized complex descriptions and absent explanations. The question changed 
from how or why models worked to whether or how well they worked. “Implicit trust” took the 
place of complex descriptions. “Explicit verification” from real-world tests supplanted absent 
explanations. What remained unresolved, however, was the foreign nature of algorithmic 
approaches themselves. Models were opaque and abstruse, but also alien—their complexity was 
described and explained, but not justified [86]. 
Collaboration, Translation, and Accountability: Implications for CSCW Research and Practice 
These findings hold important implications for the growing data science field, both within and 
beyond CSCW. Trustworthy data science systems are a priority for organizations and researchers 
alike—evident, for instance, in rubrics for assessing a data science system’s production-readiness 
[13] or rules for conducting responsible big data research [105]. Such forms of advice address a 
range of sociotechnical challenges, helping data scientists manage aspects ranging from 
performance evaluation and feature engineering to algorithmic harm and ethical data sharing. As 
CSCW and critical data studies researchers work to make data science approaches transparent, 
metrics humanistic, and methodologies diverse, their tools often travel far from their academic and 
research contexts of development, finding new homes in company servers, business meetings, and 
organizational work. The insights in this paper add three further dimensions to the effective 
practice and management of data science work by explicating how specific tensions problematize 
trust and credibility in applied data science systems, and how these problems are variously 
negotiated and resolved. 
First, rather than a natural or inevitable property of data or algorithms themselves, the perceived 
trustworthiness of applied data science systems, as we show in this paper, is a collaborative 
accomplishment, emerging from the situated resolution of specific tensions through pragmatic and 
ongoing forms of work. As our actors repeatedly told us, data are messy and models only 
approximations (or as the classic line on models has it: “all models are wrong, but some are useful” 
[11]). Perfect solutions were not required—models simply needed to be “good enough” for the 
purpose at hand [49]. Actors’ trust in data science did not therefore depend on the flawless nature of 
its execution rather on the reasoned practicality of its results. Much like actors in a “heterarchy” 
[94], we saw organizational actors treat everyday uncertainties less as impediments and more as 
sites for justifying the “worth” [8] of data, models, and results through actionable strategies. 
Organizational actors often acknowledged the always-already partial and social nature of data and 
numbers. Their attempts to negotiate and justify the worth of data science systems were thus aimed 
at identifying pragmatic ways to make the “best” out of inherently messy assemblages. Such 
uncertain moments comprise forms of focused skepticism—doubt in and negotiation of specific 
Trust in Data Science 21 
aspects of data science work (e.g., counter-intuitiveness) require trust in several other aspects (e.g., 
data sufficiency, model efficacy). This further speaks to the intimate relationship between trust, 
skepticism, and action: or, as Shapin [88:19] argues, “distrust is something which takes place on the 
margins of trusting systems.” 
Data science, particularly from an academic or research perspective, is often imagined from the 
outside as the work of data scientists interacting around reliable and widely shared tools, norms, 
and conventions—a “clean room” imagination of data and its relationship to the world. As our 
cases show, however, corporate data science practices are inherently heterogeneous, comprised by 
the collaboration of diverse actors and aspirations. Project managers, product designers, and 
business analysts are as much a part of applied real-world corporate data science as are data 
scientists—the operations and relations of trust and credibility between data science and business 
teams are not outside the purview of data science work, but integral to its very technical operation. 
A more inclusive approach to the real-world practice of corporate data science helps us understand 
that while quantified metrics and statistical reasoning remain visible and effective forms of 
calculated trust, the crystallization of trust in applied data science work is both calculative and 
collaborative. Quantified metrics allow close inspection of data and models, yet numbers appear 
differently to different actors—sometimes stable, and at other times mutable. Numbers not only 
signify model performance or validity, but also embody specific technical ideals and business 
values. Understanding the pragmatic ways of working with the plastic and plural nature of 
quantified trust and credibility metrics can further nuance existing CSCW and HCI research on the 
design of trustworthy systems [37,58,82] and reliable performance metrics [1,48,79]—managing 
numbers is as important as engineering them. 
Second, we show how the collaborative accomplishment of trust requires work on the part of 
diverse experts to translate between different forms of knowledge. For instance, data scientists 
work to explicate algorithmic approaches to business analysts, and business teams strive to explain 
business knowledge to data scientists. We see in such forms of translation work a common trait—
the recourse to stories and narratives to not only explain algorithmic results [30,98], but also 
describe suspect data and model attributes. Narrativization serves various purposes ranging from 
delineating the abnormal from the ordinary (e.g., what is and isn’t noisy data) to rendering opaque 
technicalities natural and commonplace (e.g., models are inscrutable, but so are human brains). As 
exercises in world-making [41], narratives invoke specific lifeworlds [39,44] to explain what things 
mean or why they are a certain way. Algorithmically-produced numbers may be black-boxed, but 
tales about and around such numbers engender forms of intuitive and assumptive plausibility. 
While datasets comprise information on people and their practices, people remain largely invisible 
in data, dismembered into rows, columns, and matrices of numbers. Forms of narration and story-
telling, however, are often all about people, significantly shaping their identity, agency, and forms 
of life. Narrativization, as a form of doing, implicates data science between reality and possibility, 
between signal and noise—indeed, between life and data. 
These insights on the narrativization of data and results add new dimensions to existing CSCW 
and HCI research on explainable machine learning systems [1,82,86,101] and human perception of 
data representations and algorithmic working [21,48,59,103], making visible not only the plurality 
of reasonings and modes of justification [8] that actually subtend applied data science work, but 
also the multiple forms of expertise that constitute such work in complex real-world settings. 
Workable data, for instance, is computationally accomplished through multiple forms of pre-
processing—each attempt at reorganization adds value, but also removes possibilities. Researchers 
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strive to create better tools to identify and resolve issues with real-world data, but even data 
assumed or made workable by data scientists are sometimes distrusted by other organizational 
actors. The identification of mess is an exercise not just in statistics and computation, but also 
narrativization and interpretation. Understanding and articulating the relation between distinct 
forms of data curation and their interpretational and narrative affordances, for instance, can 
complement current technical work on data pre-processing and curation—artifacts that are 
simultaneously partial and practical. Imagined as an exclusively algorithmic venture, data science 
would appear as the stronghold of data scientists working with specialized and sophisticated 
computational tools. Acknowledging the domain-specificity of data, however, surfaces the many 
other forms of necessary expertise supplied by diverse organizational actors. These different 
experts influence the development of a data science system in different ways, pulling the project in 
specific, sometimes contradictory, directions. Understanding the work of these experts can provide 
new pathways for CSCW, HCI, and critical data studies researchers into the study, design, and 
management of data science systems. 
Third, we show how different experts hold accountable different parts of data science systems, 
highlighting the distributed and multifarious nature of data science trustworthiness. For instance, 
data scientists cross-validate results, while business analysts inquire about data scientists’ business 
knowledge and assumptions. In some cases, trust is placed not in the analysis, but in the identity of 
the analyst. At a few points in our fieldwork, we saw that data and results were assumed correct by 
business stakeholders because of the trust they placed in specific individuals. Data scientists trusted 
datasets more if they came from business analysts as opposed to data engineers. Business teams 
trusted results coming from senior analysts and scientists. As forms of ‘social scaffolding,’ 
people’s perceived reputation and knowledgeability at times provided working solutions to 
problems of credibility. Embedded within these different forms of trust valuations, are distinct 
approaches to data science auditing. On the one hand, audits function as a form of algorithmic 
witnessing— backtracking technical procedures to ensure the reliability and validity of model 
results. As exercises in corroboration, such audits necessitate data science expertise on the part of 
the auditors. On the other hand, audits contribute to deliberative accountability [46]—situating 
model contingencies, technical discretion, and algorithmic results in the broader social, cultural, 
and organizational milieu. Acknowledging the role of other experts, such audits encompass 
multiple ways of ‘seeing’—of witnessing data science results and processes. Between algorithmic 
witnessing and deliberative accountability, we see the everyday work of applied corporate data 
science betwixt and between algorithms, businesses, calculations, and aspirations—technically 
valid, but also practically sound. 
Juxtaposing algorithmic witnessing with deliberative accountability provides new research 
pathways into the effective evaluation, governance, and management of data science systems. As 
CSCW and HCI researchers work to make data science models transparent and results explainable, 
their focus should include not only unpacking algorithmic black-boxes, but also studying how data 
and models move between teams, products, and services. This enables us to better understand how 
the inability of organizational actors, sometimes even of data scientists, to understand models is an 
artifact not only of their black-boxed nature, but also, for instance, of their counter-intuitiveness. 
This is especially problematic given that a large part of data science’s appeal is its ability to 
surprise us. Even when opened and made tractable, model innards and results remain complex and 
foreign in their movement between people, practices, and teams. Like other forms of alternate 
knowledge, data science’s alien-ness complicates the attribution of trust and credibility to 
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unaccountable and inscrutable truths—its foreignness sometimes mistaken by some for its 
incorrectness, and at other times celebrated as a novelty. As researchers make visible the rules 
comprising models and describe the application of these rules, they also need ways to explain and 
unpack the complex and alien nature of the rules themselves: “while there will always be a role for 
intuition, we will not always be able to use intuition to bypass the question of why the rules are the 
rules” [86]. 
Our findings also suggest some more immediately practical takeaways for data science work in 
the contexts of academic education, organizational practices, and data science research more 
generally. In learning environments, would-be data scientists are encultured into data science’s 
professional discourse, largely comprising of technical work such as data pre-processing, model 
selection, and feature engineering. As students go on to take data science jobs in corporations, their 
everyday work, however, comprises working not only with data and models, but also with project 
managers and business stakeholders. The collaborative and heterogeneous nature of real-world data 
science work remains as of now largely invisible in current data science curricula and training. 
Several of our actors argued that the data scientists they interacted with lacked, among other things, 
the “vocabulary” of working with business teams. As James – a senior business team member – put 
it: “data scientists […are] very eager to crunch numbers […], train the system, and see what kind of 
output they […can] get” (Interview, 6 November 2017). The incorporation of collaboration (e.g., 
interacting with non-data-scientists) and translation (e.g., effective communication of results) work 
into data science curricula and training is thus a good first step to ensure that would-be data 
scientists not only learn the skills to negotiate the trust in and credibility of their technical work, but 
also learn to see such forms of work as integral to the everyday work of data science. Or, to put it in 
terms of sociologists Harry Collins and Robert Evans, real-world applied data science projects 
require forms of both “contributory” and “interactional” expertise [18].   
In corporate organizations, as we show in this paper, the development of data science systems 
comprises a combination of algorithmic and deliberative accountability. Integral to both approaches 
is the need and role of documentation. At the organization, we initially discovered that there was 
much emphasis put on code documentation, but the everyday discretionary work of data scientists 
in pre-processing data, selecting models, and engineering features remained less visible and 
documented (we attempted to address this at the organization by initiating detailed project and 
decision documentation). This remains a hindrance not only for forms of inter-organization 
accountability, but also for the compliance and management of such systems in the wake of laws 
and policies such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Right to Explanation 
in Europe. With current calls for more open documentation, corporate organizations need to 
document not only algorithmic functions and data variables, but also data decisions, model choices, 
and interim results. Organizations need to allocate additional resources and efforts to make visible 
and archive the seemingly mundane, yet extremely significant, decisions and imperatives in 
everyday data science work. 
Lastly, highlighting the existence and role of diverse experts in applied data science projects, 
our work helps to further unpack the distinction between the designers and users of data science 
systems in existing CSCW and critical data studies research. The study of in-use public-facing data 
science products often works on a clear distinction between designers and users (e.g., Google data 
scientists made Google Search, which is now used by internet users). Unpacking the design and 
development work of such corporate systems, however, stands in contrast with rigid binaries—
corporate organizations are not monolithically comprised of data scientists working with their 
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algorithmic toolkits to produce computational artifacts. Project managers, product managers, and 
business stakeholders, as we show, aren’t merely the “users” of data science systems, but also in-
part their managers, stakeholders, and designers. Interpretability remains multiple [64], but so do 
the people requiring explanations. As we focus on studying and building interpretable models and 
trustworthy systems, we must also consider who attributes trust and requires explanations, how, and 
for what purposes. The decision to deploy a data science solution in a real-world product remains a 
negotiated outcome—one in which data scientists play an important, yet partial, role. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The specific nature of the dynamics witnessed in our case may differ across organizations, 
depending on the varying ways and standings with which data science (and data scientists) are 
incorporated into broader corporate settings and goals. Is data science perceived an asset to 
organizational knowledge because of its analytic capabilities or deemed necessary because of 
market competition? Do data science team members have a lot to lose if things do not work or are 
they allowed to experiment and make mistakes? Who has the final word on data science projects—
data scientists, project managers, business analysts, or business executives? Do data scientists work 
across business verticals or are they assigned to specific areas of business practice? How do the 
differences in the educational and professional backgrounds of data scientists, project managers, 
and business analysts impact data science work? Such questions speak to the uncertainties and 
heterogeneities attending the entry and practices of applied data science in corporate environments, 
and the need for further empirical study. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we showed how tensions of (un)equivocal numbers, (counter)intuitive knowledge, 
(in)credible data, and (in)scrutable models shape and challenge data science work. We described a 
range of strategies (e.g., rationalization and decomposition) that real-world actors employ to 
manage, resolve, and sometimes even leverage the problems of trust emanating from these 
tensions, in the service of imperfect but ultimately pragmatic and workable forms of analysis. As 
we work to guarantee and foster trust in applied data science, understanding the situated and 
discretionary work of trust and credibility negotiations generates new possibilities for research and 
practice—from the implications of narrative affordances and plurality of model opacity to the 
management of numbers and leveraging of expertise. As data science grows, so do its problems of 
trust. This paper is our attempt to highlight that trustworthiness in organizational data science work 
emerges through a mix of algorithmic witnessing and deliberative accountability—a calculated, but 
also a collaborative accomplishment. The organizational work of data science comprises not just 
pre-processing and quantification, but also negotiation and translation. It is these processes 
together, and not any taken singly, that ultimately accounts for the trustworthiness and 
effectiveness of data science. 
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